Resolution Of International Conflicts Through The United Nations: The Corfu Channel Case by Ahmedi, Bujar & Shehu, Shefik
European Scientific Journal May 2016 edition vol.12, No.13  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
105 
Resolution Of International Conflicts Through The 
United Nations: The Corfu Channel Case 
 
 
 
Bujar Ahmedi, PhD 
Shefik Shehu, PhD 
University of Tetova, Republic of Macedonia 
 
doi: 10.19044/esj.2016.v12n13p105    URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2016.v12n13p105 
 
Abstract 
 States have been and are still the most essential actors in international 
relations. The primary aim of each state is the maximal realization of its 
interests vis a vis other actors in the international scene. This could 
potentially result in a disagreement or even conflict. It is precisely the job 
of the international law to peacefully resolve these issues through the many 
mechanisms that it has under its disposition. Apart from the disagreements 
that could arise between/among states, such disagreement could as well 
arise between a state and another type of international actors e.g. in an 
organization or even between two or more organizations. Even in the 
resolution of these types of disagreements, one could apply one of the many 
mechanisms that are applied in the state vs. state case. When we talk of 
international disagreements, it is noteworthy to mention that they could be of 
a political nature and of a legal nature. This division is very often debated 
since each conflict is invariably linked with some political considerations. 
This is the reason why it is so difficult to define some of the criteria which 
would determine the very nature of the conflict and/or disagreement. There 
are several instruments to solve international disagreements. In the past, 
many of the disagreements between states were solved through war. 
However, since the end of the First World War, war has been considered as a 
forbidden means of solving disagreements between states.  
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Introduction 
 The Corfu Channel Case is one of the most important cases resolved 
by the ICJ since its creation. This is because it dealt with a lot of important 
issues such as freedom of the sea, the right of passage through straits, 
sovereignty, intervention, self-help measures, the responsibility of the states, 
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and compensation (Gruda, 2002). Being a case of great importance, it is 
shown not only by the fact that the case was solved by the ICJ, but it is also 
an important case for international law itself. However, it was handled by 
lawyers, political scientists, many historians, and other scholars. 
 Since 1990 until 2010, this case was treated in about 60 articles that 
were published in various journals with the Corfu Channel Incident. The 
main theme confirms that this case was of a very special character. Some 
Albanian authors who have addressed this issue either directly or 
indirectly include Arben Puto, Zejnulla Gruda, Ksenofon Krisafi, and 
Paskal Milo (Punto et al., 2002). Besides arousing the curiosity of the 
Albanian authors to study this case, it was treated by foreign authors as well.  
 The Corfu Channel Incident originates since May 15 1946. During 
this incident, two British warships, ORION and SUPERB, which passed the 
northern part of the Corfu Channel were fired by the Albanian battery 
(Albanian MFA Dossier, No 25. pp.62, 1946). Arben Puto, in his book titled 
“International Public Law”, emphasized that the British ships sailed without 
a raised flag, and the firing of the Albanian coastal batteries was done to 
gain the attention of the warships to raise their flag and make their 
affiliation known (Punto, 2008). 
 According to the official Albanian position, the Albanian coastal 
battery fired as a sign of warning to both ships. It was only after the firing 
that they raised the British flag, and the Albanian coastal artillery stopped 
the shooting. According to the official British position, the passage was 
peaceful (PRO. 1946. FO 371/58492). After this event, Albania and England 
exchanged notes which resulted to a completely two opposite positions. 
Albania stated that foreign warships had no right to pass through Albanian 
territorial waters without prior authorization.  The British position was 
different. They stated that their warships and that of other states had the 
right to an innocent or peaceful passage. According to the British position, 
the Corfu Channel is considered as an international channel. As a result, no 
state, neither England, had the need for any passage permission. However, 
the incident of May 15 1946 worsened the Anglo-Albanian relations. 
 
The case 
 After the incident of 15 May 1946, the two governments launched a 
series of actions. The Albanian government feared the possible revenge 
military retaliatory actions by the British Navy (Milo, 2010). In 17 May 
1946, Chairman Spiro Moses declared the command that prevented the 
passage of foreign warships and merchant vessels in Albanian territorial 
waters without prior notification and authorization by the Albanian 
authorities (Milo, 2010). However, the order would be communicated to the 
entire diplomatic troups in Albania. After the order of 17 May 1946, the 
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orders of the Ministry of Defense followed. Also, they had the same purpose 
of ensuring the safety and protection of the Albanian coast.  The fear of the 
Albanian state by a British invasion resulted in a dialogue between the head 
of the Albanian government of that time, Enver Hoxha, and the Yugoslav 
government leader, J.B. Tito. The meeting was held in Belgrade in June 23, 
1946. Consequently, there was no trace in the Albanian archives, but crumbs 
of protocol about what was discussed at that meeting (Milo, 2010).  Thus, 
what was discussed at that meeting can be seen in the letter of the Soviet 
ambassador in Albania, Çuvahin, which was conveyed to his foreign 
minister of the Soviet Union, Molotov. According to him, the two leaders’ 
meeting addressed several issues such as: military affairs, the condition of 
the land, and the marine borders of the Albanian state. After returning from 
Belgrade, Enver Hoxha took all measures to strengthen the protection in the 
south of the country, especially the coastal protection. On the 18 or 19 of 
August, another meeting was held with the two leaders, Albanian and 
Yugoslav. This time around, the meeting was held in Bled, Slovenia. 
There was no document that shows in detail about what was discussed in 
the meeting. According to Professor Pascal Milo, this meeting was focused 
on the scenario of placing mines in the Corfu Channel. After the meeting in 
Bled, in August 29, the chief of the Yugoslav Army, Lieutenant General 
Koça Popovic, sent a letter to the Ministry of National Defense. In his letter, 
he indirectly implied that the Yugoslav side expressed readiness to carry out 
the mining of the Albanian territorial waters in the name of their 
clearance. H o w e v e r ,  this mode was designed to preserve the 
“secrecy” of the operation.  
 On September 6, the Albanian Majesty accepts the proposal after 
been informed a few days before the Yugoslav Marine combat units left for 
the Albanian ports with the aim of taking measures.  
 The mining of Albanian territorial waters on the southern coast and 
in the Corfu Channel was done on the night of 18 September 1946. The 
mission itself was confidential. Therefore, such action was to be carried 
out at night. The process of mining was conducted by the Yugoslav 
federation with the participation of an Albanian officer. 
 The secret of mining the territorial waters in the autumn of 1946 was 
known to a very limited circle of people which include; Enver Hoxha, 
Mehmet Shehu, Bedri Spahiu, Hysni Kapo, Koçi Xoxe, Kristo Themelko, 
Nako Spiru, and other leaders of that time.  
 For  the  Englishmen,  the  incident  of  15  March  1946  that  
occurred  in  the  Corfu Channel was considered as a severe wound to the 
English national pride and its Navy. When carried out by a small country 
such as Albania, this action could not be easily accepted by the English 
state. In this regard, as a return to what happened on March 15, 1946 
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in Albania, England made a secret operation code-named XCU, on October 
5. Thus, this was associated with the operations plan of October 13, code-
named XCUI, which meant "Training Corfu”. The British secret plan was 
actually prepared to provoke the Albanian state.  
 On October 21, the preparations for operation XCU were completed. 
It was planned that during this day, the ships were to conduct the operation 
in the Corfu Channel. The British considered this day and date to be very 
important since it corresponded with the famous victory of the English 
Royal Navy of 1805. The plan foresaw that the operation would last for an 
hour. The plan would be carried out secretly, and even the Greek State was 
advised to keep it as a secret as they were informed about the operation. On 
October 22, four British cruisers and destroyers came from the port of 
Corfu and move towards the direction from the northern part of the Corfu 
Channel. At this time, what was foreseen in the British operation will not 
happen.  During the cruise, one of the British destroyers, the Samuarez, 
struck a mine and was gravely damaged. The other destroyer, the Volage, 
which was sent to assists Saumarez, struck another mine and was also 
seriously damaged. This incident was regarded as second in the Corfu 
Channel which was also a tragedy for the English. Therefore, this is because 
44 British sailors were killed and 42 were injured without calculating 
material damages. The Albanian Coast Guards helped the British 
authorities, but refused the aid offered them by the Albanian state. 
 Furthermore, this case was more severe than the case of 15 May, and 
this was why the British tried to carefully administer it from the beginning. 
It is worth mentioning that in relations with the public, they carefully 
communicated a statement to the public on October 23. Thus, they 
expressed their regret for the British ships which were damaged by mines in 
the north-east of the Corfu Channel. In addition, they reported the victims 
and promised further information as soon as possible (Gardiner, 1966). 
 Several days later, they addressed Albania by informing them about a 
mine cleaning action which they will conduct on the Corfu Channel. 
According to them, the mine cleaning in the Corfu Channel would begin 
once England got the approval of the Central Committee of Mine Clearance 
with its headquarter in Cairo, Egypt. 
 The Albanian Government rejected the proposal of England, because 
the operation did not involve the participation of the Albanian authorities.  
The Albanian state proposed a creation of a joint commission that will clear 
the mines in the Corfu Channel. This proposal was not accepted by the 
British state. As such, the Albanian state informed the UN about the 
problem through a telegram of protest on October 30, 1946. However, the 
UN did not show any reaction or particular interest regarding the telegram 
sent by the Albanian state. 
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 On the 12 and 13 of November 1946, England commenced the 
operation of clearing the mines in the Corfu Channel. On 14  November 
1946, the Central Committee of Mine Clearance openly announced that 
the operation undertaken by England on 12 and 13 of November was not 
given any authorization. Thus, the mine clearing operation in the Corfu 
Channel was conducted without the authorization of this committee. 
 On December 3, 1946, the British government addressed the 
Albanian government with a note. Through this note, the Albanian 
government was informed about the completion of the sweeping operation in 
the Corfu Channel. Also, the note disclosed their claims towards the 
Albanian government. According to the British government, during the 
operation in question in the Corfu Channel, a total of 22 mines were found. 
Two of these mines were sent to the British naval base in Malta, to develop 
an expertise. The note also stated that through the expertise, it was 
concluded that the mines were placed not earlier than 6-7 months before the 
incident and was produced in Germany. In the note, they explained that the 
Corfu Channel was cleaned once after the war. As a result, this led to the 
conclusion that the mines were placed by the Albanian government; or at 
least, the Albanian government should have been aware of the placement of 
mines. Based on the fact provided by the English government, Albania 
should apologize to England. Also, they should compensate the victims and 
the state for the damages suffered in the incident of October 22, 1946. Thus, 
these were the English claims. 
 The English note ended with the allegations that if the Albanian 
government will not accept the demands of the English party, the English 
side will request an examination by the UN and the Security Council. 
 After  analyzing  the  English  note,  and  after  appropriate  
consultations  with  the Yugoslav state on December 14, they sent a brief 
note to the British party. As the English note to the Albanian government 
was very harsh to the Albanian, the Albanian government gave a very brief 
response stating that the Albanian government was still examining the 
British note. They further stated that they are not ready to give a response to 
the British party within the deadline set by the English government in the 
note on 3 December, 1946. Indeed, the Albanian government attempted 
using tactics by delaying their response. The British Government could not 
wait anymore. Hence, on December 18, they sent another note which 
stated: "If his Majesty's Government does not receive a satisfactory 
response to the note sent to the Albanian government..., in the deadline set 
in this note, which is midnight of 23 December, as stated earlier, we would 
refer the matter to the UN Security Council.” (PRO. 1946. FO 371/58497) 
 The English note was examined very carefully by the Albanian 
authorities and on December 23, they responded to the English government 
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through a different note. Hence, this time, their note was longer than the 
previous one. On the note, they stated that Albania at that time did not 
have the tools for placing and removing mines. Given this fact that Albania 
had no tools at that time, they cannot be held responsible for placing mines 
in the Corfu Channel. To avoid further accusations about the mine 
placement, the Albanian government suggested that the mines in the Corfu 
Channel could have been placed by the Greek state. 
 After the response given by the Albanian government, the British 
state was forced to deliver the case to the UN Security Council. 
 In January 1947, England submitted the matter to the UN 
Security Council.  In accordance with Article 35 of the UN Charter 
(Paragraph 1), England requested the Security Council to discuss Albania's 
responsibility for the Corfu Channel incident (PRO. 1947. FO. 371/66884). 
 Subsequently, the SC began the review of the English request on 
February 18, 1947. The Albanian Party in the SC was represented by Hysni 
Kapo and Kahriman Ylli, while the British side was heavily represented by 
Alexander Kadogan. 
 In the UN Security Council, the first party that featured their 
positions regarding the incident in the Corfu Channel was the English side. 
The English side once again reaffirmed its position that the Albanian 
government is to be held responsible for the incident that occurred at the 
Corfu Channel. They also confirmed that the mines were placed secretly 
within a period of six months or less, and that the incident was a serious 
international crime. In addition, they affirmed strongly that their placement 
without notice constituted a crime against humanity. 
 The Albanian party rejected the English accusations. According to 
the Albanian representative, Hysni Kapo, he stated that the British had no 
evidence in the charge raised against Albania.  He stated that his country 
would never commit such act against a country with which they were an 
ally in war (Kapo, 1980). He further stated that the entry of British 
warships in the territorial waters of Albania, without notice and in war 
formation, constituted a violation of the territorial sovereignty of Albania.  
 Further examination of the Corfu Channel incident by the SC went 
on to establish a commission of inquiry, composed of one representative 
from Australia, Colombia, and Poland. The Commission drafted two reports: 
one designed by the representative of Colombia and Australia who favored 
the English side, and another report drafted by the representative of Poland 
to favor the Albanian side. It is worth noting that in the SC debate on this 
issue, most states inclined the conclusion to make Albania responsible for 
the incident. After several sessions of the SC, on March 25, 1947, the SC 
made their pronouncement concerning the issue. In the debate that 
followed in the SC, it became apparent that representatives of the 
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western countries supported England’s conclusion of accusing Albania to 
be responsible for the incidents (Puto, 2008). Therefore, it was the Soviet 
Union that opposed such a position in the SC. 
 
Court Proceedings at the International Court of Justice 
 After the veto of the Soviet Union, on April 3, under Article 36 of the 
Charter of the UN Security Council, England presented a new resolution-
project. This project proposed that the Security Council should recommend 
the parties to address the ICJ, and to solve this conflict in judicial 
proceedings. 
 However, when England was found in an unfavorable situation after 
the Soviet veto, they presented a different resolution-project to the SC on 
March 3, 1947. In March 9, 1947, the SC adopted this resolution. This 
resolution recommended that the parties should choose the conflict between 
them in the ICJ. 
 After the Security Council resolution, the English party began 
making preparations to send the case to the ICJ. Based on the preparation of 
the request that will be brought before the ICJ and to follow the process 
that would begin, a team was assigned. This team was led by Eric 
Becket and the General Prosecutor, Harley Shoukros. 
 On May 22, the English side officially presented the case to the ICJ. 
The request to petition the English case to the ICJ was based on Article 40 
of the Statute of the ICJ. In fact, this was a unilateral action of the English 
party, because under the Statute of the ICJ, a prerequisite to a court for 
review of a dispute is the agreement of the parties concerned which do not 
exist in this case. According to the English party, the court had jurisdiction 
to review the case. They argued that by referring to the Resolution of the 
Security Council which had decided that the parties should resolve the 
conflict between them in the ICJ, the Albanian government had accepted the 
requirement of the Security Council to accept all obligations as a member 
of the UN when they accepted the invitation to take part in the 
discussions that took place in the SC on the matter. In addition, the UN 
members must accept the decisions of the Security Council in accordance 
with the UN Charter. 
 ICJ,  after  accepting  the  English  request,  notified  the  Albanian  
party that  the English side had filed a suit against them.  
 On July 2, 1947, the Albanian side responded to the Court through a 
letter addressed to them. First of all, they emphasized that the British 
government had acted in violation of the Statute of the Court, and that the 
procedure followed by them was illegal. However, the Albanian government 
"in this matter, felt itself pretty confident". As such, they were ready to 
European Scientific Journal May 2016 edition vol.12, No.13  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
112 
appear before the ICJ, having the English side’s terms of violation in mind 
(Punto, 2008). 
 After receiving this response from the Albanian side, the ICJ will 
officially begin to examine the Corfu Channel case. Since the procedure 
before the ICJ was conducted in two phases, written and verbal stage, the 
Court set deadlines for the submission of documents by the parties. On 
October 1, 1947, the English side had to present the documentation to the 
Court. On the other hand, the Albanian side had to do this on December 10, 
1947. 
 Under the term fixed by the Court, on October 1, 1947, the English 
side presented their documents to the Court. On December 9, the day before 
Albania submits the documentation to the Court, Professor Puto states that 
they would make a "preliminary objection". With this, the Albanian 
government returned to the issue raised in the letter since the beginning of 
July addressed to the ICJ. Thus, this entails the procedural violations of 
the English government. Albania requested that the ICJ should state that 
the English claim was "unacceptable" and that the Court was not 
competent to review the matter without prior agreement between the parties 
(Punto, 2008). 
 On January 19, 1948, the British side presented its objections to the 
Court, where they will argue that the compromise between the two 
governments as a condition for accepting the jurisdiction of the Court asked 
by the Albanian side should not have been taken into consideration.  
 After the actions of the two governments, Britain and Albania, were 
completed on February 26, 1948, the first court hearing on the case 
commenced. Thus, this was the first court session of the ICJ, from when it 
was inaugurated as one of the main organs of the UN (ICJ 1946). 
 The case judged by 16 judges from different countries. Thus, these 
judges include: President Basdevant, Vice-President Guerro, and Judges 
Alvarez, Hackworth, Winarski, Zorieic, De Visscher, Klaestad, Badawi 
Pacha, Krylov, Read, Hsu No, Azevedo, and Sir Arnold McNair. 
Invoking the Statute of the ICJ, Albania was entitled to appoint an ad hoc 
judge. Therefore, Daxner was appointed as the ad hoc judge (ICJ 1947). 
 It is important to note that both sides had made their preparations 
and their teams were created to defend the case before the ICJ. Albania was 
represented by Ylli Kahreman as their agent, who was the then Ambassador 
of Albania in Paris. Also, they appointed the Czechoslovak Vahosh as their 
lawyer. On the other hand, the English side was represented by Eric Becket, 
in the capacity of the agent, and the Attorney General Shoukros Harley as 
their lawyer.  
 According to the procedure established by the Statute of the ICJ, the 
Court will first hear out the "preliminary objection" on the Albanian side. 
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Thus, this was heard by the Court during the first three sessions in which 
the Albanian party presented their position, with regards to the complaint 
presented by the English side. In the other three sessions, the English side 
also presented their arguments in objection to Albania.  
 On March 25, 1948, the ICJ finished examining the issue and made 
a decision based on the preliminary objection of the Albanian side which 
was rejected. Following this decision, the Court set new deadlines for 
submission of documents by the parties. According to these new deadlines, 
Albania had to submit its counter-memorandum until September 15, 1948 
and September 28, 1948. However, the English side presented their 
objections. 
 After the Court announced the decision on that very same day on 
March 25, K. Ylli and Becket informed the Court that they had signed a 
compromise agreement on behalf of their respective governments. This is for 
the purpose of bringing to trial the issue of the Corfu Channel incident. 
However, it contained two points in the form of two separate questions that 
were being put forth to the International Court of Justice: 
1. Is Albania responsible, under international law, for bombings that 
occurred on October 22, 1946 in Albanian waters, and also for the 
human losses that followed? And if so, does this present a case for 
reparations? 
2. Has Great Britain, based on the international law, violated the 
sovereignty of the People's Republic of Albania with the undertaken 
military action by the British  Navy  in  Albanian  waters  on  October  
22,  1946,  and  on the  12  and  13 of November 1946, and is there 
any place to give her satisfaction? (Milo, 2010) 
 The agreement of compromise was in favor of the Albanian. This is 
because the Court cannot review the matter without a compromise agreement 
between the parties which serves as a condition for accepting the jurisdiction 
of the Court. On the other hand, the decision of the Court dismissed the 
preliminary objection of Albania. It constitutes a disadvantage for the 
Albanian side. It is important to note that the reasons for such a decision by 
the Court was as a result of the Albanian government's letter to the Court, 
dated July 2, 1947. Thus, this letter stated that the Albanian government 
"felt very confident in this matter". It was very much ready to appear before 
the ICJ, which actually implied the acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Therefore, this clearly shows that the Government did not have a well-
prepared team that would present the case before the Court.  
 While analyzing their weaknesses, the Albanian side continued to 
strengthen the team and mitigate whatever disadvantage that would help 
them proceed with the case at the ICJ. In  this  regard,  it  later involved  the  
renowned  French  lawyer,  Pierre  Cot,  professor  of international law, and 
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an outstanding personality of French politics. Part of the Albanian side also 
constitutes Nordman Joe, Marc Jacquier, and Paul Villard. This panel of 
attorneys represents the Albanian side in the Court. The Albanian side also 
engaged consultants and renowned experts of mines, so that they could 
appear before the Court with dignity. 
 After signing the Compromise agreement on June 15, the Albanian 
side put forward their Reminder to the Court. Through this, they laid out all 
the facts against the English charges. The Reminder stated that: "The 
Albanian government has never laid mines in the waters of Saranda or 
elsewhere after 15 May 1946 or before that date, and never had knowledge 
of such action." The Reminder also attempts to place an argument on the 
actions undertaken by the Albanian side with respect to the incident at the 
Corfu Channel. It stated that on 22 October 1946, British military vessels 
had entered the Albanian coastal waters in the war lineup. Thus, they did not 
correspond with the British position that the transition was peaceful. 
 On July 30 1948, the English side responded to the Albanian’s 
Reminder letter with a Counter-Reminder was delivered to the Court. Thus, 
they try to weaken the position of Albania before the Court. They urge 
Albania "to shed light on the circumstances in which the two Yugoslav 
warships, Miljet and Meljine, which were loaded with the German contact 
mines type Y, sailed southwards from the port of Sibenik on,  or about 18 
October 1946, and continued toward the Corfu Channel" (ICJ 1948). The 
British side also stated categorically that the transition was peaceful and 
was not intended to infringe between inland Albanian waters. In the 
Counter-Reminder, it was also stated that on the 12 and 13 of November 
1946, Albania’s sovereignty was never infringed upon. On September 20, 
1948, the Albanian presented a Counter-Reminder to answer the British 
Counter-Reminder of 15 to 30 July 1948. In this document, the Albanian 
side once again reiterated their position of 15 June 1948. Also, they added 
the issue of why the English government in its counter-Reminder of 30 July, 
has not submitted the documents that dealt with the operations of 22 
October 1946 to the Court. In this regard, the Albanian party sought from 
the British side to put at the disposal of the Court, all the documents that 
had to do with the trips of the English authorities, their mission on October 
22, 1946, cruise books  and  journals,  set  paths,  reports,  and  the 
enforcement  records  of  the  two  destroyers, Saumarez and Volage. 
 After the Albanian party presented this Counter-Reminder, the ICJ 
began the public hearings of the case. Therefore, November 9, 1948 will 
mark the beginning of the public hearings in the Court. This is with the 
English side presenting the case first through their lawyer. Their lawyer, 
Shoukros, stated that the passage of British ships in Albanian territorial 
waters on October 22, 1946 was a peaceful transition. In their discussions, 
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the British lawyers will also focus on who should take responsibility for 
setting the mines in Albania’s territorial waters, and the incurred damages 
on the English side. In addition, they argue that the British ships were 
transitioning peacefully in Albanian territorial waters.  They maintained that 
at no point did they violate the sovereignty of Albania on October 22, 1946. 
By this, they are contending with the charges filed by Albania on 22 
October 1946 that the British ships transition was not peaceful. 
However, there was an operation that was essentially provocative and 
hostile (ICJ 1948/49). 
 The Albanian side began the discussions before the Court on 15 
November 1948. Through attorney Nordman, t he y  objected to the theses 
raised by the English party, stressing that Albanian could not perform such 
actions at a time when it had just applied for UN membership.  
 Over the course of 16, 17, and 18 November, another attorney 
presented Albania’s government positions with respect to the incident. In his 
speech, he begins with a statement from the famous French philosopher of 
the seventeenth century, Pascal: "Politics has its reasons which reason knows 
not of." He stated that "the honor of Albania and perhaps its national future, 
its independence are at stake, because the Albanian government is accused to 
have committed an act contrary to international law obligations and 
humanitarian laws”.  
 Furthermore, English ships as well as the documentation concerning 
the orders of the English authorities were done with  regards  to  their  
mission  on  October 22,  1946,  records and  journals  of navigation, 
established routes, reports, and records of enforcement commanders of the 
Saumarez and Volage destroyers. According to Cot, on October 22 1946, the 
norms of international law were violated. The request for the submission of 
documentation regarding the Corfu incident, although was an undeniable 
proof that would have probably given another direction to the trial, was 
never submitted by the British side.  
 Therefore, Cot closed his discussion with rare skills and 
professionalism. He addressed the Court with the words: "I believe I have 
proved that England had violated international law by penetrating into 
Albanian territory. It is not the English people that are sitting before the 
Court, but the English state. The only issue that arises here is not to learn 
whether the English nation is a great nation, but simply to learn whether 
the English acted always in accordance with the rule of law in the Corfu 
Channel case.” (ICJ 1949) 
 From November 22 1948 until December 17 1948, witnesses and 
experts appeared before the Court. From the English side, the captains of 
ships Saumarez and Volage,  Mauritius  direction  officer,  and other  
officers  of  the  English  Navy  such  as commander Whiteford were 
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witnesses. O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  Saranda port’s captain Shtino Ali, 
Commander of Coastal Defence and former deputy, Akile Polena, as well 
as the ex-vice-president of the Executive Committee of Saranda, Mr. Xhavit 
Muco were the Albanian side’s witnesses. Based on the capacity of experts, 
the Albanian side was represented by Captain Oramov and Admiral Mulek 
(Milo, 2010). 
 
ICJ’s Verdict  
 After listening to the expert witnesses, the ICJ withdrew to take the 
verdict. On April 9, 1949, they gave the verdict.  According to the verdict, 
Albania was responsible for what happened on October 22, 1946.  
 The Court's verdict will provide answers to both questions that both 
parties had referred to the Court with their Compromise agreement of 25 
March 1948. Regarding the question: “Is Albania responsible, under 
international law, for bombings that occurred on October 22, 1946 in 
Albanian waters, and also for the human losses that followed? And if so, 
does this present a case for reparations?” Therefore, the Court responded by 
stressing that the government of Albania is responsible for blasting the 
mines in the Corfu Channel on October 22, 1946. This is because they have 
no option but jus t  have  to  be aware of who set the mines. This part of 
the decision was adopted with 11 votes for and 5 against. The court also 
mentioned the issue of reparations. In this question, the  court  will  not  
only  give  an  affirmative  answer  to  the  question,  but also declared  itself 
to be competent in determining the amount of reparations that the Albanian 
side should give. At this point, the decision was taken with 10 votes for and 
6 against (Milo, 2010). 
 In the second question: Has Great Britain, based on the international 
law, violated the sovereignty of the People's Republic of Albania with the 
undertaken military action by the British Navy in Albanian waters on 
October 22, 1946, and on the 12 and 13 of November 1946, and is there any 
place to give her satisfaction?, the Court gave two answers. Firstly, with 
14 votes for and two against, the court stated that there had been no 
violation of t h e  territorial sovereignty of Albania on October 22, 1946, 
on the day of the mine blasts. Consequently, they argued this in the light of 
the right to pass through international channels, without mentioning whether 
English warships performed a demonstration of force. Secondly, the Court 
unanimously recognized that on the 12-13 of December 1946, the English 
government violated the territorial sovereignty of Albania. This they 
accomplished by sending their navy to clear mines unilaterally, without the 
knowledge of the Albanian authorities (Puto, 2008)  
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Conclusion 
 Notwithstanding the fact that Albania considered the Court to be 
incompetent in determining the amount of reparations on December 10, 
1949, the ICJ set the amount of reparations to be 843.947 pounds. This 
amount is the compensation that Albania had to pay regarding the Corfu 
Channel incident (Puto, 2008). Therefore, this decision was communicated 
to the Albanian government which will, in turn, continuously challenge the 
decision of the ICJ. Furthermore, it was the Corfu Channel incident that has 
sabotage the relationship between Albania and England for more than five 
decades.  
 Aside from Bilateral issues, with the verdict on the Corfu Channel 
case, the International Court of Justice and the United Nations had shown 
the capacity to impose international law. In addition, it also presents itself as 
a credible institution for resolving international conflicts among its 
members or beyond. 
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